The New Rules: Navy Finally Embracing Role in Small Wars

Last week I gave a plenary address to the Joint Warfighting Conference 2009 -- the annual East Coast naval extravaganza co-sponsored by the U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) and the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA). This mega-conference opened my eyes to just how much things have changed inside our naval forces thanks to the ongoing long war against violent extremism.

To give you an idea of the ground covered, I have to take you back almost 17 years.

That's when the Department of the Navy came out with its post-Cold War strategic white paper entitled, ". . . From the Sea." This seminal document argued that the Navy's undisputed command of the seas compelled it to come closer to shore and influence events there, lest it risk losing its relevance in an emerging era of smaller wars. It was an incredibly bold shift for the country's naval leadership, signaling the end of the submarine mafia's firm control of the fleet and the subsequent return of surface commanders and marine flag officers to the forefront of naval leadership.

I helped gin up that white paper. My military mentor in the process was a Marine colonel just selected for his first star, Tom Wilkerson. Like most of those who participated in this "best and brightest" brainstorm, Wilkerson and I walked away hoping we had made a lasting difference.

We were wrong.

The navy spent the next decade retreating from this vision -- in effect, pulling itself back toward blue-water scenarios. In the mid-1990s, thanks to two minor standoffs with the Chinese over Taiwan, the Navy began to throw in its lot with the Big War crowd (think Air Force, and Army armor), while the Marines and Army infantry found themselves persistently drawn into lengthy interventions on the low end of the conflict spectrum.

Network-centric warfare and "transformation" defined Big War Blue (Navy, Air Force), while "military operations other than war" -- all those pesky interventions that sucked in Small Wars Green (Army, Marines) -- were relegated to the category of "lesser includeds": dutifully performed, but not important enough to constitute scenarios for which the Pentagon prepared or procured.

Sept. 11 and the interventions it spawned changed all that, but it took some time. While the two initial wars -- toppling the Taliban and Saddam -- were easily won, the follow-on post-wars turned out to be magnificently complex. When the losses piled up, a veritable revolution-from-below brewed within the Army and Marines, as younger officers agitated for necessary changes in tactics, training and equipment.

Furthermore, as rising Army and Marine flag officers (e.g., Gen. David Petraeus and Gen. James Mattis) successfully revamped doctrine and strategy, Big War Blue's long-held grip over the Pentagon was effectively broken. Robert Gates has progressively locked in this sea change since becoming secretary of defense in late 2006. Once reappointed by President Barack Obama, Gates started aggressively reorienting the Defense Department's acquisition strategy from the "there and then" of fantastically high-tech, future warfighting scenarios, to the "here and now" of today's hybrid wars, dominated by low-end actors who move back and forth across the conflict spectrum with agility.

Which brings me back to the USNI/AFCEA conference just held in Virginia Beach. I've attended a few of these in the past, and they're typically heavily tilted toward navy themes, navy panels and navy presenters.

Not this time.

From its theme ("Building a Balanced Joint Force") to its star participants (overwhelmingly Green), this conference focused most decisively on the future of small wars -- not large ones. Its master of ceremonies was Tom Wilkerson, now retired from the Marines and serving as the U.S. Naval Institute's CEO, while Gen. James Mattis, commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command, lorded over the proceedings as its frequently acknowledged "intellectual godfather." The most prominent Navy flag to participate? Adm. Eric Olson, a former SEAL who now heads up Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

Mattis' keynote warning could not have been more clear: Without the strategic reorientation pushed by Secretary Gates, naval forces "face the prospect of being dominant and irrelevant at the same time." SOCOM's Olson was equally direct. "The type of war we wage is not determined by the type of troops we put on the ground," he said. America's military has to adjust to this "new normal," in which "war does not mean what it used to," or else continue to suffer the consequences of that maladjustment.

I walked out of the conference with a firm sense that, despite all the fierce resistance over the years to the naval strategic vision that Wilkerson and I helped craft in the Cold War's shadow, our navy has truly -- and finally -- embraced the fight . . . from the sea.

Thomas P.M. Barnett is senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine. His latest book is "Great Powers: America and the World After Bush" (2009). His weekly WPR column, The New Rules, appears every Monday. Reach him and his blog at thomaspmbarnett.com.