Special Report: Naval Special Warfare In the Forefront of the War on Terror

Waging the war on terrorism has resulted in the heaviest combat use of special operations forces since the Vietnam War. The Navy's small band of elite warriors is playing a major role. While engaged in dozens of customary maritime settings, such as the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the littoral waters of the Philippines, the Navy SEALs (SEa, Air, Land) and Special Warfare Combatantcraft Crewmen (SWCCs) saw their most intensive service in Afghanistan--400 miles from the sea.

Two SEALs already have made the ultimate sacrifice, and at least two others have been wounded in combat in the harsh desert and snow-capped mountains of the land-locked nation. At one point early in Operation Enduring Freedom, a SEAL, Capt. Robert S. Harward, commanded a multiservice international force of about 2,800 special operations forces (SOFs) and conventional fighters in and around Afghanistan.

The unconventional fight against the al Qaeda terrorists and their Taliban allies, Harward said, was "a validation of what I call SOF-centric warfare. "Where SOF has traditionally been seen on the periphery, supporting conventional forces, this is the first time you saw SOF in the center--being supported by conventional forces," Harward said. Although he could not say that Afghanistan would be an apt model for future conflicts, the veteran SEAL said: "The lesson I take away from this is that the advances in technology, capability, and weapons ... have allowed those small, flexible forces to have more impact on the battlefield."

A Two-Front War The war on terror has brought new recognition for the Navy's elite Sea-Air-Land warriors, who have worked largely in the shadows since they were created in 1962 from the Underwater Demolition Teams first formed during World War II. The Naval Special Warfare (NSW) force today has a total of approximately 4,700 active-duty personnel, including 2,200 SEALs and 600 SWCCs (who operate and maintain the specialized vessels that SEALs use on many of their missions). Organized and trained primarily for counterterrorist and unconventional missions, the SEALs were a natural choice for the military response to the 9/11 attacks. Despite the great distance from the sea, these Navy fighters were among the first U.S. forces that deployed into Afghanistan in 2001. They have been heavily engaged since then. Rear Adm. Eric T. Olson, former commander of Naval Special Warfare Command, said their tasking by U.S. Central Command had expanded threefold since 11 September 2001, a demand that, in Olson's view, "validates our missions and organization. "We are doing what we prepared to do, and we have demonstrated that our capabilities match our enthusiasm," Olson recently said at a forum in the Washington, D.C., area.

The initial phases of the war in Afghanistan were led by Navy SEAL Rear Adm. Albert M. Calland III (who directed special operations for the U.S. Central Command before relieving Olson as the Navy's top SEAL last August). As the first U.S. flag officer to set foot in Afghanistan, Calland immediately saw the need to fight on two fronts to achieve success. His northern command, code named Task Force Dagger, focused on fighting "the war for Afghanistan" and working with the Afghan resistance to defeat the Taliban government. Calland's southern command, code named Task Force K-Bar, focused on "the war on terrorism" and working unilaterally to destroy al Qaeda's ability to conduct operations in Afghanistan. Carrying the title of "commodore," Harward led Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force South--or Task Force K-Bar--from October last year through April 2002.

His command included about 1,300 men inside Afghanistan and another 1,500 assigned elsewhere in the theater of operations, he said. In addition to his own SEALs and SWCCs, he led special operations fighters from the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and seven allied nations, along with U.S. conventional troops.

A Joint Team Harward also was able to draw on the other capabilities of the joint special operations team, which was supported by AC-130 Specter gunships and helicopters. And, when he needed more help, he could call on U.S. strike aircraft, including Navy carrier-based F/A-18 Hornets and F-14 Tomcats, for close air support--and on the U.S. Marines of Brig. Gen. James N. Mattis's Task Force 58, Harward said. "It was a real testament to the joint team," he said. Harward established particularly close relations with Mattis, an extension of the usual operational ties between SEALs and Marine Expeditionary Units. Before Mattis's 400-mile move into Afghanistan from amphibious ready groups operating in the Arabian Sea, the SEALs surveyed and monitored the Pakistani beach used as a nighttime staging area and the austere airfield in central Afghanistan that became the forward operating base dubbed Camp Rhino.

Deployed by special operations aircraft at night, the SEAL team at Rhino kept the airfield under surveillance for four days and four freezing nights on a mission that ran twice as long as expected. When Marine helicopters flew in, the SEALs marked the landing zone and kept watch until the more heavily armed Marines were on the ground.

The Marines returned the favor later--providing CH-53E Super Stallion heavy-lift helicopters to transport SEALs on missions into mountains too high for Air Force Special Operations helicopters. Harward said his multinational and joint force conducted 75 combat operations, including reconnaissance, target designation for allied warplanes, and direct action against suspected Taliban or al Qaeda fighters. Because of years of peacetime training and real operational missions with allied Special Operations Forces, the commodore said, "I could take any one of the shooter forces, put them in an operation, and they would do the job." If there were problems with communications capabilities or languages, he would "fill the gaps" by assigning U.S. special operators as liaison personnel, a core mission for the elite warriors, Harward said.

One of the SEALs' most publicized missions was the exploration of a complex of more than 70 caves and complexes at Zhawar Kili, in the eastern Afghan mountains. A planned 12-hour assignment stretched to nine days as SEALs uncovered and destroyed a huge store of munitions, weapons, armored vehicles, and artillery, and retrieved vast amounts of intelligence material.

On 4 March, a more tragic mission came in support of conventional forces in Operation Anaconda, when intense enemy fire crippled two Army helicopters and killed eight special operations warriors, including a SEAL--Petty Officer 1st Class Neil C. Roberts. Another SEAL, Chief Petty Officer Matthew J. Bourgeois, was killed on 27 March after stepping on an enemy land mine. Still, Task Force K-Bar detained more than 100 suspected al Qaeda or Taliban fighters and killed several dozen more during its operations in Afghanistan, Harward said.

Although the media focus was on the SEALs, Harward noted that a number of SWCCs also were in-country, helping to operate Harward's command-and-control network at his tactical operations center (TOC). "They were not running a boat ... but their skills made them essential to my TOC," he said. A Paradigm Shift That was part of the paradigm shift that the Afghanistan operations represented, Harward said. "SEALs are not expected to be high and dry. We're normally considered to operate with one foot in the water." But Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrated the operational versatility of fighters who take seriously their title as Sea-Air-Land warriors, he said. "We spend a lot of time and money building our individual skills," he said. For example, SEALs complete special climbing schools, primarily to prepare for missions that might call for them to climb onto ships or offshore oil platforms. But when helicopters could not deliver them to some of the higher mountains in Afghanistan, the SEALs used their climbing skills to reach lofty observation points. And, because they emphasize physical conditioning, Harward said, the SEALs were able to operate in mountains above 10,000 feet without being stricken with altitude sickness."The Navy special warfare mantra of equipping and preparing the individual paid dividends," he said.

While segments of Harward's command were operating in Afghanistan, others were at sea conducting maritime interdiction missions and searching for escaping terrorists in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. At the same time, Naval Special Warfare commandos were helping the Filipino armed forces track down and kill the notorious leader of the Abu Sayaf terrorists in the waters around the southern islands of the Philippines.

SEALs also are likely to be among the 800 U.S. special operations and regular troops reportedly stationed in Djibouti, across the Red Sea from Yemen, a suspected haven for al Qaeda terrorists. Without being specific--because of the need for operational security--public affairs officer Lt. Cdr. Darryn James said NSW units are in about 25 locations around the world--a number he said is about average.

Command Restructured In the midst of all of these operations, the NSW headquarters in Coronado, Calif., was implementing significant changes in organization, training, and deployments under a concept called Naval Special Warfare 21 (NSW 21). The changes are designed to bring greater efficiency to the heavily engaged command while providing more effective operational forces for the regional combatant and fleet commanders around the world. A key part of NSW 21 was formation of new NSW squadrons by joining each SEAL team with a SEAL Delivery Vehicle detachment, a special warfare boat detachment, a mobile communications detachment, tactical cryptology support, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) experts.

The squadron elements are now going through a four-phase, two-year cycle of six months of individual-level training, six months of unit training, and six months of squadron training before beginning an all-hands six-month operational deployment. The SEAL teams' senior leaders now deploy with the squadron, instead of remaining at their bases in the United States. "The idea behind the squadron is that they train ... together for six months as a force ... and then deploy together," said Cdr. David Courtney, a staff officer at the SEALs' Coronado headquarters. Elements of the squadron usually will deploy to different areas, Courtney said. "But, if anything happens that brings the pieces back together, they have worked together" and will be a more effective team, he added.

Under this concept, the SEAL team commander, executive officer, and command master chief (the team's senior enlisted chief petty officer) will be available to provide more senior leadership if required. To allow the new squadron rotation, the command created SEAL Team Seven at Coronado and another team at Little Creek, Va. The growth to eight SEAL teams was made without increasing the number of SEALs on active duty by reducing the number of platoons assigned to a SEAL team from eight to six. To improve the command's efficiency, NSW 21 consolidates many support functions--such as communications, diving units, logistics, and training--in the two special warfare groups, instead of spreading them through the teams.

The deployed units also will be aided by the Mission Support Center, located in San Diego, Calif., "a centralized resource and support facility for mission planning and operations," a command spokeswoman said. The deployed forces can "reach back" to the center for assistance and information in such areas as intelligence, weather reports, and oceanographic data. Rather than having each SEAL team run its own training cell, that function has been consolidated into a training unit on each coast of the United States, Courtney said. This will allow the teams to concentrate on their missions and will standardize training.

With the increased demand on the Special Operations Command, its commander, Air Force Gen. Charles R. Holland, has proposed a large increase in his current $4.9 billion annual budget and a 9,000-man increase in his 47,000-person force. Most of the increased personnel would be in support functions, including communications and aviation. Holland and Naval Special Warfare leaders agree that it is difficult to increase the size of the force because of the intensive training required to produce such elite fighters in a short time.

It takes more than two years to deliver a combat-ready SEAL to his first team. Up to 70 percent of applicants to the Navy's special-warfare program do not make it through the screening, indoctrination, and training process. Despite the challenge, Navy commandos do not worry about diluting the quality of personnel assigned to the Naval Special Warfare community. "We will not allow that to happen," said Harward. * New Ways to Fight An Amorphous Enemy The War on Terrorism validated one of the "truths" that competent Special Operations Forces (SOF) cannot be created after emergencies occur. Naval Special Warfare operators did exactly what we were trained to do in response to 11 September--we reacted.

Whether it was conducting on-ground special reconnaissance for what would become Camp Rhino, engaging in direct-action missions in the snow-capped mountains of Afghanistan, performing boarding operations in the Arabian Gulf, or working with the Philippine armed forces to destroy a terrorist network, our Navy SEALs and SWCCs continued to show the versatility that makes them special. However, while we have been very successful in combating today's threat, we are quickly realizing that we are dealing with an adversary who ascribes to no recognizable organization and adheres to no geographic boundary.

The tactics of today's terrorists are changing--although hostage-taking still occurs, significant terrorist actions are more likely to result in mass casualties. Today's terrorist primarily is interested in inflicting grave damage on free and democratic nations. We must adopt new ways to combat this amorphous enemy because in many cases there is no longer time to intervene, to negotiate, to react. When I took command of the Naval Special Warfare Command in August, I told our forces that we need to focus on being preemptive--to find the enemy before they commit their deadly acts. In the future, I doubt we will see large concentrations of terrorists as we did in Afghanistan. Our enemy will become more dispersed and more elusive. Our military has evolved from a time when a large conventional force with a small amount of intelligence could accomplish the mission through an overwhelming application of force. The fight against this dispersed and elusive enemy requires a small, flexible, responsive force supported by a robust intelligence capability. Also, the decision to act must be made within hours, not days or weeks. This concept of "SOF-centric warfare" is built on the foundation that in order to stop future terrorist acts from happening effectively--to stop the emergency before it occurs--we need to be a preemptive, vice reactive, force. This is imperative in leading Naval Special Warfare into the future.

Forward presence, power projection, rapid response and "sea basing" were key to success in Afghanistan. Our focus will be to work with the Navy-Marine Corps team to enhance our collective capabilities while helping to transition Naval Special Warfare into a more capable and responsive force. This will be challenging, but it is a challenge that we must face now. Transforming Naval Special Warfare from a reactive to a preemptive force is my highest operational priority. Rear Adm. Albert M. Calland III Commander Naval Special Warfare Command A Legacy of Valor The elite band of warriors called Navy SEALs, now waging the unconventional war against terrorism, was created to fight an earlier unconventional conflict in Vietnam during the 1960s.

In response to President John F. Kennedy's call for the U.S. armed forces to develop nontraditional warfare capabilities, the Navy established the first two SEAL teams in January 1962, filling their ranks with personnel drawn from the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) that had fought so effectively in World War II and in Korea. Members of SEAL Team One soon were sent to Vietnam to join UDT members already there conducting hydrographic and beach surveys. SEAL advisors instructed the Vietnamese in clandestine maritime operations. SEALs also began a UDT-style training course for the Biet Hai Commandos, the Junk Force commando platoons, in Danang. Reinforced over the years by platoons from SEAL Teams One and Two, the SEALs conducted a wide variety of missions and quickly became feared by the veteran Viet Cong cadres in the Mekong Delta.

Operating in both squad and platoon strengths, the SEALs conducted patrols and interdiction missions, seized enemy prisoners and senior Viet Cong cadre, and staged a number of successful raids to recover South Vietnamese prisoners. They also were a key part of the effort to stop enemy supplies moving through the Delta and South Vietnam's coastal waters. Other missions, highly classified at the time, entailed the rescue of U.S. aviators shot down while conducting aerial missions over North Vietnam.

Although they operated mainly from a variety of small boats and fast combat craft, the SEALs also used Navy submarines, surface ships, and helicopters to get into and out of enemy-held territory. Three SEALs were awarded the Medal of Honor during the war in Vietnam--Lt. (jg) Joseph R. Kerrey, Lt. Thomas R. Norris, and Engineman 2nd Class Michael E. Thornton--and five were decorated with the Navy Cross.

A total of 44 SEAL team members were killed in action, but the teams claimed more than 2,000 enemy killed. A similar number of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese fighters and officials were captured. SEAL teams acquired a reputation for courage, tenacity, and deadly professionalism. Forged in combat in the swamps and jungles of Vietnam, their legacy resounds to the present day. * Training the Way You Expect to Fight The training regimen that leads to the awarding of the distinctive "Trident" warfare pin worn by the Navy's elite SEALs is often described as the toughest in the world. It is a key factor behind the reputation for skill, courage, and devotion to duty that these Sea-Air-Land warriors have earned in their 40-year history.

Training lasts approximately 13 months for enlisted men and 15 months for officers. The attrition rate is routinely 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively. Ten weeks of indoctrination and "pretraining" at the Naval Special Warfare Center in Coronado, Calif., prepare applicants for the challenges ahead. Then comes a 25-week Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL, or BUDS, course.

The first phase of the course focuses on testing the applicants' physical and mental endurance through running, swimming, calisthenics, and obstacle courses. The fourth week is the notorious "Hell Week"--five-and-a-half days of constant physical activity in and out of the water that includes grueling team exercises designed to push all applicants to the limits of their endurance. The men are exposed repeatedly to the bone-chilling waters of the Pacific Ocean and are allowed a maximum of four hours sleep during the five days of Hell Week.

Survivors face another four weeks of similar physical testing, with the addition of some basic military skills. The next eight-week phase emphasizes combat diving skills, and the final nine-week phase shifts to land-combat techniques. Those who pass BUDS attend the three-week U.S. Army Basic Airborne course at Fort Benning, Ga., for parachute qualification. At that point, enlisted men return to Coronado for 15 weeks of SEAL qualification training, which teaches the full range of combat skills and tactics required of a team member. Prospective SEAL officers must complete 12 weeks of specialized training, including Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training, diving and weapons range safety-supervisor courses, and the five-week Naval Special Warfare Junior Officer Training Course. They then continue through the SEAL qualification training that will, if successful, allow them to wear the "Trident" and join their first SEAL team.